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A new era has begun in antitrust regulation ofpatent pools. With the
issuance of the 1995 Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual
Property and the 1997 Department of Justice approval of the MPEG LA
patent pool, federal antitrust authorities have espoused a more permissive
attitude toward patent pools and cross-licensing arrangements than in
recent decades. Procompetitive benefits undoubtedly justify the formation
of patent pools in certain contexts, but serious anticompetitive risks are
also present, particularly in standard-dependent industries. This Note
argues that the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission
should not adopt a per se rule of legality for the pooling of blocking
patents, and that these agencies must carefully delineate the permissible
scope of broader pools.
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Introduction
Intellectual property law has always existed in tension with the goals
of antitrust law, and the courts' deference to the policy goals of these two
sets of laws has vacillated over the century.1 Courts and regulators have
I For reviews of the historical tension between patent and antitrust law, see generally
FLOYD L. VAUGHAN, THE UNITED STATES PATENT SYSTEM: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC CONFLICTS IN
AMERICAN PATENT HISTORY (1956); Willard K. Tom & Joshua A. Newberg, Antitrust and Intellectual
Property: From Separate Spheres to Unified Field, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 167 (1997).
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Vol. 16:359, 1999
Patent Pools and the Antitrust Dilemma
recently begun upholding the goals of intellectual property law to the
detriment of antitrust law. One example of this deference, already
documented in the case law, is the ability of electronics manufacturers to
circumvent tying laws by copyrighting elements of their service tools.
2
This Note examines another instance in which intellectual property law is
encroaching upon core principles of antitrust law.
Patent pools pose one of the most intractable problems in antitrust
law. When rival innovators hold overlapping patent rights, neither may
develop the underlying technology without infringing the other's patent. If
the patentees adopt a cooperative solution and cross-license or pool their
patents, they effectuate a horizontal merger of their assets and can
perpetuate monopoly pricing. With the strengthening of intellectual
property law, patent rights are increasingly blocking the development of
new technologies, and support is growing to loosen legal constraints on
patent pools.3 This Note acknowledges that legitimate, even imperative,
arguments justify loosening antitrust restraints on patent pools. The thesis
of this Note, nonetheless, is that undue deference to patents risks
sacrificing core principles of antitrust law.
The Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) have recognized the difficulties posed by patent licensing
agreements. They have jointly promulgated guidelines that point to a need
2 Manufacturers are generally prohibited from tying repair services to equipment sales,
particularly when sufficient consumer demand exists to support an aftermarket for service. See
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 462-63 (1992) (ruling that a separate
market could exist for Kodak equipment sales and for repairs); Virtual Maintenance, Inc. v. Prime
Computer, Inc., 11 F.3d 660, 667 (6th Cir. 1993) (finding that software support and hardware
maintenance are separate products); Service & Training, Inc. v. Data Gen. Corp., 963 F.2d 680, 684
(4th Cir. 1992) (finding that repair services and diagnostic software may constitute separate markets).
If the underlying equipment and the tools for equipment repair are not covered by intellectual property
protections, then equipment manufacturers may violate the antitrust laws if they foreclose independent
service organizations (ISOs) from the aftermarket for repair. Equivalent conduct, however, is
permissible when equipment manufacturers fence off the service aftermarket by copyrighting elements
of equipment and/or tools for repair. When the underlying equipment, for example, comprises a
copyrighted operating system, then ISOs are prohibited from repairing the systems, under the theory
that to do so would require them to boot the system, load the copyrighted system into the random
access memory (RAM), and thus unlawfully "copy" the system. See Triad Sys. Corp. v. Southeastern
Express Co., 64 F.3d 1330, 1335 (9th Cir. 1995) (affirming that copying for the purpose of the
copyright law occurs when a computer program is transferred from permanent storage to a computer's
RAM, and that the ISO infringed the equipment manufacturer's copyright); MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak
Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518 (9th Cir. 1993) (same); Advanced Computer Servs., Inc. v. MAI
Sys. Corp., 845 F. Supp. 356, 360 (E.D. Va. 1994) (same). If the equipment manufacturer creates
copyrighted diagnostic software, the manufacturer may withhold licenses from ISOs and thereby
effectively prohibit ISOs from the service aftermarket. See Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support
Corp., 36 F.3d 1147 (1st Cir. 1994) (ruling that holder of a copyrighted diagnostic tool may refuse to
license ISOs); Service & Training, Inc. v. Data Gen. Corp., 963 F.2d 680 (4th Cir. 1992) (same).
3 See Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 700 (1998); Robert P. Merges, Contracting
into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CAL. L. REV.
1293, 1355-58 (1996).
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to balance the countervailing goals of preventing monopolistic behavior
and of promoting the development of technology.4 The guidelines signify a
commitment by the agencies to recognize the procompetitive benefits of
patent pools, and to formally depart from the per se prohibitions that have
been applied to patent licensing practices in decades past.5 Notably, the
guidelines grant an exception to the antitrust laws by permitting holders of
blocking patents to pool their patents and jointly to set royalty rates.6 This
Note considers, in depth, the issues raised by this position. This Note
proceeds in four parts. Part I describes patent pools, cross-licensing
agreements, and the factors that lead to their formation. Part II overviews
the history of federal regulation of patent pools, culminating in the 1995
DOJ/FTC Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property.
Part III outlines the procompetitive benefits of patent pools. Finally, Part
IV advances theories of the anticompetitive effects of these arrangements.
The Note argues, in conclusion, that the DOJ and FTC should not adopt a
per se rule of legality for the pooling of blocking patents, and that
enforcement agencies must carefully delineate the permissible scope of
broader pools.
I. Blocking Patents and Patent Pools
A. Blocking Patents, Complementary Patents, and Competing Patents
A primary cause of the formation of patent pools is the issuance of
overlapping patent rights to technology. The relation of patents to one
another may be described as blocking, complementary, or competing.
1. Blocking Patents
Blocking patents naturally result from the diffuse, incremental
process of innovation. Theoretically, a pioneer patent grants its holder a
"prospect right" akin to that of a mineral lease, permitting him to develop
all technologies underlying the metes and bounds of the patent.7
Technology is far more dynamic than mineral veins, however, as the
4 See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE
LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 105 (1995), reprinted in AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, THE
1995 FEDERAL ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:
COMMENTARY AND TEXT (1995) [hereinafter IP LICENSING GUIDELINES].
5 See Bruce B. Wilson, Remarks to Michigan State Bar Antitrust Law Section and Patent
Trademark and Copyright Law Section, reprinted in [1969-1983 Current Comment Transfer Binder]
Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 50,146, at 50,146 (Sept. 21, 1972).
6 See IP LICENSING GUIDELINES, supra note 4, at 107, ex.10.
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prospector is incapable of foreseeing all the potential products covered by
the original patent. Innovation would be stifled if the pioneer alone were
granted rights to develop improvements on the original work.
Sacrificing clarity of legal titles for incentives to innovate, the Patent
and Trademark Office (PTO) often grants improvement, or blocking,
patents.8 The improvement patent is deemed to be "subservient" to the
earlier, "dominant" patent.9 The subservient and dominant patents are said
to block one another.' 0 The subservient patent cannot be exploited without
infringing upon the dominant patent." Likewise, the dominant patent
cannot be developed in the improved embodiment without permission
from the subservient patentee. 2 Although the granting of blocking patents
provides incentives to innovate, it results in significant legal
entanglements. 13
Pioneer technologies frequently result in the issuance of blocking
patents. The Wright brothers, for example, were inspired by the flight of
buzzards to develop and patent a method for stabilizing flight by warping
the wings of an aircraft. 4 Their patent covered any system that varied the
lateral margins of the wings in opposite directions.' 5 Soon thereafter,
Glenn Curtiss and Alexander Graham Bell improved upon the Wright
brothers' wing-warping device by using a set of wing flaps, or ailerons.
6
The Curtiss patent was issued in 1916, by which time all airplanes used
wing flaps instead of the Wright method.' 7 The Curtiss patent, however,
was found to infringe upon the Wright patent.18 As a result, Curtiss had no
legal right to make, use, or sell his ailerons without a license from the
Wright brothers,' 9 and the Wright brothers had no legal right to make, use,
or sell Curtiss's commercially successful form of the stabilizing device.2°
In patent parlance, the Wright brothers held a dominant patent, Curtiss
held a subservient patent, and the patents mutually infringed and blocked
one another.
Public key encryption provides a modem analogue to the aircraft
8 See Robert P. Merges, A Brief Note on Blocking Patents and Reverse Equivalents:
Biotechnology as an Example, 73 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y. 878, 878-79 (1991).




13 See id., supra note 8, at 878-80.
14 See George Bittlingmayer, Property Rights, Progress, and the Aircraft Patent Agreement,
31 J.L. & ECON. 227, 230-31 (1988).





20 Extensive litigation resulted from this mutually blocking situation, requiring federal
intervention. See id.
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patents. Public key encryption is a method for ensuring confidential digital
communications over insecure lines.21 Public key encryption is "arguably
the single most important tool to construct a rich and robust bedrock of
electronic commerce., 22 The method requires an algorithm to generate a
set of public and private keys that lock and unlock messages. 23 The method
was first devised and patented at Stanford University, and licensed to
Cylink.24 The Cylink patent contains broad claims that do not specify an
algorithm.25 Soon thereafter, a team of scientists at the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology developed and patented an algorithm, and licensed
its use to RSA (named after the surnames of the algorithm's inventors,
Ronald Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Leonard Adleman).26 The RSA algorithm
was successfully commercialized and became an industry standard.27
Cylink alleged that the RSA algorithm infringed its patent, asserting that
RSA lacked the legal right to make, use, or sell its algorithm without
permission from Cylink.28 Conversely, RSA claimed that Cylink lacked
the legal right to practice its invention in the commercially preferred
embodiment. 29 But for the settlement of the litigation through the
formation of a patent pool, this vitally important technology would have
been blocked by rival patents.3°
2. Complementary Patents
Complementary patents, similar to blocking patents, are those patents
covering technologies that are useless absent a license to a separate
patented product.3' Complementary patents result when different inventors
21 See generally RSA Data Sec., Inc. v. Cylink Corp., No. 96-20094 SW, 1996 WL 107272,
at *1-2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 1996); Philip R. Zimmerman, Cryptography for the Internet, SCI. AM., Oct.
1998, at 110, 110-15.
22 Digital Signature: Let the Battles Begin, INFO. L. ALERT: A VOORHEES REP., May 27,
1994 [hereinafter Digital Signature].
23 See Zimmerman, supra note 21, at 112.
24 See The Friendliest of Enemies: Shaky Marriage Between Crypto Firms Shatters, INFO.
L. ALERT: A VOORHEES REP., Sept. 9, 1994 [hereinafter Crypto Pool]. Public key encryption was
devised by a colorful personality, Whitfield Diffie. For a description of him and his path to invention,
see Thomas Bass, Whitfield Diffie: A Semi-Private Conversation with the Headman of the Cypherpunk
Revolution, OMNI, Dec. 22, 1995, at 86.
25 See U.S. Patent No. 4,200,770 (Apr. 29, 1980). Claim 1, for example, specifies no
algorithm. See id.
26 See U.S. Patent No. 4,405,829 (Sept. 20, 1983); see also Crypto Pool, supra note 24.
27 See Darryl K. Taft, Patent Rights Are New Issue in Signature Standard Fight, GOV'T
COMPUTER NEWS, Mar. 30, 1992, at 57.
28 See At War over Crypto, INFO. L. ALERT: A VOORHEES REP., Oct. 13, 1995.
29 See Crypto Pool, supra note 24.
30 See id.
31 See Gilbert Goller, Competing, Complementary and Blocking Patents: Their Role in
Determining Antitrust Violations in the Areas of Cross-Licensing, Patent Pooling and Package
Licensing, 50 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 723, 725 (1968).
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independently patent different components of a larger invention.32 For the
production of a light bulb, for example, rights to a patent over a vacuum
bulb are inadequate without rights to a patent for a tungsten filament.33
Absent cooperation between the holders of the complementary patents,
products like the light bulb may be blocked from development due to
competing patent claims.
3. Competing patents
The term "competing patents" describes patents over products or
processes that compete with each other in the market.34 Competing patents
result when inventors devise totally novel products or processes that
provide market substitutes for patented goods, or when inventors
sufficiently modify existing patented goods so that the original patent is
deemed "invented around" and not infringed. As an example, glass jars
were commonly manufactured according to a number of distinct processes,
such as the suspended gob feeding process and the suction process.35
Absent collusion between the holders of the patents to these rival
processes, glass manufacturers could choose between processes and erode
the monopoly profits of the patentees down to competitive levels.3 6
4. Imperfect Categorization
The distinctions among the categories of blocking, complementary,
and competing patents are unclear. One scholar noted that the lines of
demarcation among the three kinds of patents "are very narrow" and that
"in many instances, a mere shift of focus or frame of reference will result
in a different categorization for the same patents. 37 A number of legal
factors obscure the distinctions among these categories.
First, not all patent claims are valid. Patents are procured from the
Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) in ex parte proceedings.3" Given the
charged workload of the PTO and the absence of adversarial scrutiny,
patent examiners frequently overlook relevant prior art that would
otherwise preclude certain claims from being issued. Patents typically
32 See id. at 725.
33 See id.; cf. United States v. General Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 480-81 (1926) (describing
General Electric's patents over the lightbulb).
34 See Goller, supra note 31, at 725-26.
35 See Hartford-Emire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 393 (1945).
36 See generally Mark F. Grady & Jay 1. Alexander, Patent Law and Rent Dissipation, 78
VA. L. REv. 305 (1992); Robert P. Merges, Rent Control in the Patent District: Observations on the
Grady-Alexander Thesis, 78 VA. L. REV. 359 (1992).
37 Goller, supra note 31, at 726.
38 See Michael J. Meurer, The Settlement of Patent Litigation, 20 RAND J. ECON. 77, 77
(1989).
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contain multiple claims.39 When previously overlooked prior art is
revealed, one or more of these claims can be invalidated through litigation.
Thus, a patent with facially broad claims may have a relatively narrow
scope once certain of its claims are invalidated. For example, patents that
may have been perceived as blocking prior to litigation (i.e., mutually
infringing) may be ruled to be competing (i.e., valid but not infringed) at
trial once certain claims are invalidated.
Second, the doctrine of equivalents provides that the enforceable
scope of a patent extends beyond the literal wording of the claims. 40 The
purpose of the doctrine is to prevent would-be infringers from
circumventing a patent by trivially modifying the patented good.4' The
doctrine effectively creates a penumbra of rights around the literal claims
of the patent.42 This penumbra of rights is "deliberately left nebulous" to
create a deterrent against copyists. 43 The doctrine, however, obscures the
relation between patents, such that it is not clear whether two patents are
blocking, complementary, or competing.44
Third, the aberrations of patent litigation further complicate the
relations between patents. Whereas the PTO grants patents, the courts
determine their enforceable scope. Notwithstanding the attempts by the
Supreme Court45 and the Federal Circuit46 to regularize patent litigation, it
remains "far from the case" that the scope and enforceability of patents is a
settled area of law.47 Federal Circuit precedent offers little guidance to trial
judges on the appropriate level of specificity for construing patent
39 See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 4,200,770 (Apr. 29, 1980) (claiming eight different
embodiments and methods of public key cryptography).
40 See Wamer-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 21 (1997); Charles
Greiner & Co. v. Mari-Med Mfg., 962 F.2d 1031, 1035 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
41 See Robert C. Haldiman, Ephemeral Infringement by Customizable Software: Liability
Structures to Promote New Technology and Protect the Old, 80 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y
651, 663-64 (1998).
42 See id. at 664.
43 Id.
44 See Paul R. Michel, Enabling the Jury to Apply Patent Law Rationally, I YALE SYMP. L.
& TECH. 1, 2 (1998) <http://lawtech.law.yale.edu/symposium/98/speech-michel.htm>. Judge Michel
states:
You can ask very good patent lawyers in this country whether a certain device
infringes a given patent, and a lot of them will tell you, "Well, I'm not sure."
Some will say, "I think yes," and others will say, "I think no." Any system that
routinely produces such a scattering of conclusions from competent, intelligent,
and well-informed lawyers indicts itself in my view.
Id.
45 The Supreme Court recently pronounced that the interpretation of a patent's claims, or
claim construction, shall be a matter of law to be resolved by the judge, rather than a matter of fact to
be resolved by the jury. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 388-91 (1996).
46 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, established in 1982 with specialized
subject-matter jurisdiction over intellectual property disputes, is widely credited with promoting
uniformity in patent litigation. See, e.g., Helen W. Nies, Celebrating the Tenth Anniversary of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 505 (1992).
47 Michel, supra note 44, 2.
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claims. 4 The complexity of patent law and the underlying facts, moreover,
often overwhelm juries.49
The result of the aforementioned factors is an imprecision in the
patent system that often creates overlapping rights over technologies. The
PTO might purposefully grant blocking patents. Alternatively, courts may
interpret otherwise distinct patents as blocking, either through a broad
construction of the literal claim language, by applying the doctrine of
equivalents, or through unpredictable jury verdicts. Patentees, too, may
deliberately acquire blocking positions as a strategic move to frustrate the
patenting programs of competitors.5° Thus, a number of patents will often
cover the same product, creating difficulties for those seeking to develop
their patented technology.
B. Patent Pools and Cross-Licensing Arrangements
When more than one patentee holds rights to a technology, neither
party has a right to develop its products absent a license from the other
patentee. 51 Technology becomes blocked under the overlapping patent
rights. One method of solving this problem is to pool the patents into a
single entity. Another approach is for the parties to execute cross-licenses
to each others' patents. This Section will describe the structure and
functioning of patent pools and cross-licensing arrangements, and will
provide a close look at one patent pool, MPEG LA.
1. Patent Pools
Patent pools are private contractual agreements whereby rival
patentees transfer their rights into a common holding company for the
purpose of jointly licensing their patent portfolios."2 Pools can comprise as
48 See id. 5.
49 Judge Michel of the Federal Circuit states:
Patent law is a very complex area of law that has half a dozen big pieces, each of
which has five or ten smaller pieces. These are all laid out in the thirty or forty
pages that are read to jurors. Because the instructions are just too complicated,
have too many parts, and are read only once to the jury, jurors may not be able to
render a well-founded verdict. . . . The jury is simply read a series of interlocking
rules and told, "Now you go and decide."
Id. 7.
50 See Richard J. Gilbert & David M.G. Newbery, Preemptive Patenting and the
Persistence of Monopoly, 72 AM. ECON. REv. 514, 524 (1982); John Vickers, Pre-Emptive Patenting,
Joint Ventures, and the Persistence of Oligopoly, 3 INT'L J. INDUS. ORG. 261, 272 (1985). Recent
empirical evidence suggests that patents in the United States are widely procured with the intention of
blocking the patenting strategies of rivals. See Wesley Cohen et al., Appropriability Conditions and
Why Finns Patent and Why They Do Not in the American Manufacturing Sector, 16 (June 24, 1997)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
51 See Merges, supra note 8, at 878-79.
52 See Merges, supra note 3, at 1340.
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few as two patents, or as many as hundreds." Although the contractual
provisions governing each pool are tailored to the technologies and patents
at hand, patent pools generally share two common characteristics. First,
patent pools consolidate the patent rights into a central, independent
entity.54 In many cases, the entity will be a partnership 5" or limited liability
corporation.56 The entity then sells licenses to the portfolio of pooled
patents, often as a single package.57
Second, patent pools establish a method for valuing the patents and
for dividing up the royalty stream generated through licensing revenues."
Several methods can be used to allocate this stream of royalties. In some
pools, like the aircraft manufacturers' patent pool, an arbiter will assess the
relative value of the patents held by the pool, and allocate an increased
share to especially valuable patents. 9 In other pools, each patentee is'
allocated an equal share of the royalty stream.60 The royalty allocation
scheme can be critical to the success or failure of a pool, particularly in
light of the difficulty of valuing intellectual property.6'
The agreements are frequently employed as a means of settling
existing litigation, with recent examples including patent pools in the laser
eye surgery62 and the public key encryption 63 industries. Pools can also be
formed in advance of litigation to preclude likely suits and to promote the
rapid development of technology. For example, the Manufacturers Aircraft
Association was formed under government order on the eve of World War
I to resolve patent disputes between Orville Wright and Glenn Curtiss and
53 The Hartford-Empire pool, for example, comprised over 600 patents. See Hartford-
Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 400 (1945).
54 See Merges, supra note 3, at 1347.
55 For example, laser eye surgery patents were pooled into a partnership, Pillar Point
Partners. See In re Summit Tech., Inc., FTC Docket No. 9286, 1998 FTC LEXIS 29, 8 (Mar. 24,
1998) (complaint) [hereinafter Summit Technology Complaint]. Public key cryptography patents were
pooled into Public Key Partners. See Crypto Pool, supra note 24.
56 For example, patents to the MPEG protocol for the compression of audio and visual
digital signals were pooled into a Delaware-based limited liability corporation, MPEG LA. See Letter
from Joel Klein, Acting Assistant Attorney General, to Gerrard R. Beeney, Esq., partner, Sullivan &
Cromwell (June 26, 1997) <http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/busreview/I 170.htm> [hereinafter Klein
MPEG Letter].
57 The MPEG LA patent pool is one such example. See infra notes 76-103 and
accompanying text.
58 See Merges, supra note 3, at 1347.
59 See Bittlingmayer, supra note 14, at 232-35.
60 The MPEG LA patent pool for the licensing of patents relating to the MPEG protocol is
one such example. This pool is discussed in depth below. See infra notes 76-103 and accompanying
text.
61 See RSA Data Sec., Inc. v. Cylink Corp., No. 96-20094 SW, 1996 WL 107272, at *3.4
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 1996) (resolving breakup of pool that dissolved due to dispute between partners
over licensing practices); Robert Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and Bargaining Breakdown: The
Case of Blocking Patents, 62 TENN. L. REV. 75, 75 (1994).
62 See Summit Technology Complaint, supra note 55 1 13.
63 See Crypto Pool, supra note 24.
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spur aircraft production.64 More recently, the Department of Justice
approved the pooling of patents over the MPEG6' and DVD6 6 protocols
relating to the compression, transmission, recording, and playback of audio
and video signals, with the goal of facilitating development of on-line and
broadcast communications.
2. Cross-Licensing Arrangements
Cross-licensing arrangements provide an alternative mechanism for
carrying out the goals of patent pools. In contrast to patent pools, cross-
licensing arrangements do not employ a central entity for holding the
patents.67  Instead, firms holding overlapping patent rights mutually
execute licenses to gain access to one another's patented technology.68
When cross-licenses are executed royalty-free, no direct economic harm is
created.69 Patentees, however, may be reluctant to enter into royalty-free
cross-licensing arrangements, as these would create open competition over
what would otherwise be monopoly goods.70 Often, patentees seek to enter
such cross-licensing arrangements to shield a bogus patent from
litigation. 71 When cross-licensing arrangements are designed for more than
just protecting defective patents, mutual royalty schemes or other
restrictions are likely to be incorporated into cross-licensing provisions.72
Although they differ procedurally, cross-licensing agreements are
largely equivalent to patent pools for the purposes of antitrust analysis7 3
Many of the major technology cartels of this century were effectuated
through cross-licensing agreements, rather than through patent pools.
74
64 See Bittlingmayer, supra note 14, at 230-32.
65 See Klein MPEG Letter, supra note 56.
66 See Letter from Joel I. Klein, Assistant Attorney General, to Garrard R. Beeney, Esq.,
partner, Sullivan & Cromwell (Dec. 16, 1998) <http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/busreview/2121.htm>
[hereinafter Klein DVD Letter].
67 See RISDALE ELLIS, PATENT LICENSES § 528 (1958).
68 See id.
69 See Bittlingmayer, supra note 14, at 229.
70 See George L. Priest, Cartels and Patent License Arrangements, 20 J.L. & ECON. 309,
357 (1977) ("[S]ince the cross-licensing makes each firm a competitor of the other, the two must agree
to restrain sales to avoid competing away the patent rents.").
71 See, e.g., United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174, 178 n.2 (1963); United States
v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 420 (1956) (Warren, J., dissenting); see also Klein
DVD Letter, supra note 66. In the diaper industry, Kimberly Clark and Procter & Gamble entered into
a cross-licensing arrangement after seven years of litigation once it became clear that Procter &
Gamble's patents were at risk because of the litigation. Through the cross-licensing scheme, the firms
were able to extract double royalties from other diaper manufacturers. See Tara Parker-Pope, Cleaning
Up: Stopping Diaper Leaks Can Be Nasty Business, P&G Shows Its Rivals, WALL ST. J., Apr. 5, 1999,
at Al.
72 See, e.g., United States v. Line Material, 333 U.S. 287, 314-15 (1948) (condemning a
royalty-free cross-licensing agreement that stipulated a pricing scheme for sublicensees).
73 See Priest, supra note 70, at 359 n. 188.
74 See. e.g., United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174, 174 (1963) (condemning
369
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The 1995 Federal Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual
Property give .similar treatment to cross-licensing agreements and patent
pools. 5 The remainder of this Note will not distinguish between these two
forms of technology exchanges.
3. One Example: The MPEG LA Patent Pool
MPEG LA provides a striking example of a modem day patent pool,
not only in terms of its importance as a means for advancing technology,
but also in terms of its anticompetitive potential. MPEG LA, which stands
for Moving Pictures Expert Group Licensing Administrator, is a limited
liability company devised to pool the rights to all patents deemed essential
for implementing the MPEG-2 protocol.16 MPEG-2 is a protocol, or syntax
and semantics, for compressing and transmitting digitalized audio and
video signals.7 7 The MPEG-2 protocol is complex, with five major
technological components.78  The pool contains hundreds of patents
worldwide, currently including forty-six U.S. patents, 79 and more "in the
international cross-licensing scheme to destroy Japanese sales of sewing machines); see also Hearings
on Global and Innovation-Based Competition Before the Fed. Trade Comm "n 49 (1995) (statement of
John Barton, Professor, Stanford Univ.) [hereinafter FTC Testimony] (stating that cross-licensing
arrangements can be set up such that "explicit or implicit barriers" restrict extension of licensing rights
to outside parties); id. at 55 (statement of F.M. Scherer, Professor, Harvard Univ.) (stating that massive
international cross-licensing arrangements underlay the cartelization of the 1920s and 1930s). The U.S.
diaper industry is currently dominated by Procter & Gamble and Kimberly Clark, who have settled
mutual legal disputes through a cross-licensing arrangement that holds the rest of the industry at bay.
See Parker-Pope, supra note 71.
75 See IP LICENSING GUIDELINES, supra note 4, § 5.5.
76 For an overview of the MPEG LA patent pool, visit the rather remarkable MPEG LA
website at <http://www.mpegla.com>. The site contains a slideshow description of its patent portfolio,
as well as powerpoint presentations presented at MPEG LA conferences describing various technical,
legal, and strategic issues relating to 'the protocol.
77 There are several versions of the MPEG protocol. MPEG-1 is "the standard for storage
and retrieval of moving pictures and audio on storage media," as approved in November 1992 by the
International Standard Organization (ISO). MPEG, THE MPEG HOME PAGE (visited Apr. 4, 1999)
<http://drogo.cselt.stet.it/mpeg/> [hereinafter MPEG HOME PAGE]. One implementation of MPEG-I is
the controversial MP3 protocol (formally, MPEG-I layer 3), which allows for transmission of digital
audio signals over the Internet, and the piracy of many copyrighted works. See Nikki Goth ltoi, Hard
Day's Night: The Music Industry is Struggling to Adapt to the Internet, RED HERRING, Jan. 1999, at
60, 60-62; Neil Strauss, Expert to Help Devise Formatfor Delivering Music on Net, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
1, 1999, at Cl.
The most recently approved version of MPEG is MPEG-4 version 1, which was standardized in
October 1998 for use in multimedia applications. See MPEG HOME PAGE, supra. MPEG-4
incorporates copyright management systems which will help recording industries to safeguard their
copyrights online. See Strauss, supra. Future protocols include MPEG-4 version 2 (to be standardized
December 1999), and MPEG-7 (to be standardized July 2001 as the content representation standard for
information searches). See MPEG HOME PAGE, supra.
78 The five components are spatial encoding, motion compensation, picture sequence, bit
rate control, and systems. See MPEG LA, AN OVERVIEW OF MPEG LA (visited Apr. 4, 1999)
<http://www.mpegla.com/slideshow/java/slide8a.html> [hereinafter OVERVIEW OF MPEG LA].
79 See OVERVIEW OF MPEG LA, supra note 78 (counting all U.S. patents and reissue
patents, and excluding expired patents).
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evaluation pipeline."' There are currently fourteen different companies
that have contributed patents to the pool.8' The Department of Justice
granted MPEG LA procompetitive clearance in June 1997.82
The MPEG-2 protocol, and its progeny, is vitally important to the
information age. The MPEG-2 protocol is the basic transmission syntax
for digital television (DTV).83 The MPEG-4 protocol (presently not
included in MPEG LA) will be the foundation for Internet transmission of
audio and video works. 84 The MPEG-7 protocol, to be released in 2001,
will be "the content representation standard for information searches. 85
Audio and video information, in one form or another, will flow according
to MPEG standards.
The MPEG LA pool offers a package license to firms whose products
and services implement the MPEG-2 standard. The package license
confers a license to all "essential" patents in the MPEG-2 portfolio.
8 6
Additional patents, not included in the portfolio, are available for specific
implementations.87 The pool offers a standardized five-year license to all
prospective licensees. 8 The licensing royalties do not change if patents are
added to the portfolio during the five-year licensing period, although the
royalty rate may increase by up to 25% in a license renewal. 89 Each patent
in the pool is valued equally. 90
As mentioned above, the pooling agreement states that only essential
patents will be included in the portfolio. An essential patent is "any Patent
claiming an apparatus and/or method necessary for compliance with the
MPEG-2 Standard under the laws of the country which issued or published
the Patent." 9' An independent License Administrator selects the essential
patents.92 The Administrator solicited over 8,000 patent abstracts, studied
over 800 patents belonging to over 100 different assignees, and originally
80 OVERVIEW OF MPEG LA, supra note 78.
81 The licensor list is available at OVERVIEW OF MPEG LA, supra note 78.
82 See Klein MPEG Letter, supra note 56.
83 See MPEG HOME PAGE, supra note 77.
84 See Strauss, supra note 77.
85 MPEG HOME PAGE, supra note 77.
86 See MPEG-2 Patent Portfolio License § 1.21 (unpublished document, on file with
author).
87 Specific implementations include "butterfly DCT circuits, telescopic motion vector
search, smart encoding techniques, such as using the output of the motion compensation or motion
estimation to control the quantizer, intra-slice refresh, etc." OVERVIEW OF MPEG LA, supra note 78.
88 See Klein MPEG Letter, supra note 56 (quoting Licensing Administrator Agreement §
3.2); see also OVERVIEW OF MPEG LA, supra note 78.
89 See OVERVIEW OF MPEG LA, supra note 78.
90 See Dana J. Parker, Standard Deviations: Everybody into the (Patent) Pool!, EMEDIA
PROF. (Sept. 1998) <http://www.emediapro.net/EM1998/standard9.html>.
91 MPEG-2 Patent Portfolio License, supra note 86, § 1.18. For a more technical definition,
see OVERVIEW OF MPEG LA, supra note 78.
92 See Klein MPEG Letter, supra note 56.
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selected twenty-seven patents to be included in the pool. 93 The DOJ
described these twenty-seven patents as "most, but not all, of the Essential
Patents," thus leaving open the possibility that newly discovered or newly
issued patents could be incorporated.94 The Department of Justice does not
directly analyze the characteristics of the selected patents, but rather
evaluates the lawfulness of the pool based on the representations of the
License Administrator.95
MPEG LA is an important means for facilitating the development of
technology. The patent pool provides a single license to most, if not all,
patents that are essential to implementing the MPEG standard.96 The pool
also helps eliminate patent disputes between holders of essential patents,
since such disputes would chill the willingness of any prospective licensee
to proceed with product development.97 The procompetitive benefits of
patent pools will be discussed in more detail in Part III.
Nevertheless, the anticompetitive potential of the MPEG LA patent
pool is enormous. The DOJ's approval of the pool validates a collectively
enforced monopoly over a fundamental communications standard.
Whereas many such standards are established as open protocols, digital
audio and video transmission over the Internet will be heretofore governed
by a proprietary protocol.9" The pool, moreover, is growing rapidly. In less
than two years, the pool has nearly doubled-from twenty-seven patents in
June 1997 (when the pool was originally approved)99 to forty-six U.S.
patents in March 1999.100 The monopoly power enjoyed by MPEG LA is
likely to be particularly strong and durable because its patents cover a new
standard expected to become ubiquitous as DTV and the Internet take
hold. 0' Some of the biggest risks of the pool are that it might suppress the
development of competing technologies' 0 2 and shelter invalid patents from
litigation. 0 3 Although this danger should be mitigated by the requirement
of essentiality of the pool's patents, the rapid growth of the pool heightens
these risks. The anticompetitive risks of patent pools will be discussed in
more detail in Part IV.
93 See id. at 4-5.
94 Id. at 3.
95 See id. at 9.
96 See OVERVIEW OF MPEG LA, supra note 78.
97 See Crypto Pool, supra note 24 ("There is nothing like a heated patent dispute to chill the
waters of commerce in an emerging industry.").
98 See infra notes 259-277 and accompanying text.
99 See Klein MPEG Letter, supra note 56.
100 See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
101 See Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust and the Internet Standardization Problem, 28 CONN. L.
REv. 1041, 1067, 1074 (1996).
102 See Klein MPEG Letter, supra note 56.
103 See id. This is precisely the theory of the FTC in its investigation of the Pillar Point
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II. Antitrust Regulation of Patent Pools: From National Harrow to the
1995 Guidelines
Patent pools have played a prominent part in the legal and industrial
history of the United States. Federal antitrust regulation of patent pools has
shifted dramatically over the past century. In the early 1900s, authorities
granted broad deference to the licensing practices of patentees. By mid-
century, however, courts and regulators had established strict per se rules
against many patent licensing practices, and had generally condemned
pooling behavior. Currently, a return to more permissive standards has
begun under the 1995 Federal Antitrust Intellectual Property Licensing
Guidelines.'1 4
A. The Start of the Antitrust Era: Patents Pools as a Shelter for
Collusion
Patents pools served as an unconditional shelter for collusion in the
first two decades of the Sherman Act. The doctrine of freedom of contract
gave expansive power to patentees and other holders of industrial
property, 105 and common law antitrust jurisprudence offered little
precedent for the Sherman Act to limit the powers of patentees. 10 6 In the
1902 case of E. Bement & Sons v. National Harrow Co.,07 the Supreme
Court ratified the dominance of patent law over federal antitrust law.
Confronted with a patent pool over float-spring tooth harrows that fixed
uniforn price schedules, the Court refused to find a violation of the
Sherman Act. 10 8 Instead, it accorded patentees an unfettered right to pursue
collusive dealings under the protection of the patent laws. The Court ruled
that patents grant "absolute freedom" to the patentee to sell his invention,
notwithstanding that his licensing practices serve to "keep up the
monopoly or fix prices."' 0 9 The Court reasoned that although the pool
104 See IP LICENSING GUIDELINES, supra note 4.
105 See Tom & Newberg, supra note 1, at 169 (providing citations).
106 See HANS B. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: ORGANIZATION OF AN
AMERICAN TRADITION 47 (1954) ("[T]he common law background [of antitrust law] could furnish but
little guidance when the courts were to be faced with the problem of drawing a reasonable borderline
between the scope of the patent monopoly, on the one hand, and the scope of the antitrust law, on the
other."); VAUGHAN, supra note 1, at 40-41 (describing the sewing machine patent pool of the mid-
nineteenth-century, its anticompetitive effects, and the fact that no legal action was taken against it);
Tom & Newberg, supra note I, at 168-69 (describing the relative strength of patent law in early years
of antitrust era).
107 186 U.S. 70 (1902).
108 See id. at 72-75, 92.
109 Id. at 91 (stating, in full, that "the general rule is absolute freedom in the use or sale of
rights under the patent laws of the United States. The very object of these laws is monopoly, and the
rule is, with few exceptions, that any conditions which are not in their very nature illegal with regard to
this kind of property, imposed by the patentee and agreed to by the licensee for the right to
manufacture or use or sell the article, will be upheld by the courts. The fact that the conditions in the
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perpetuated monopoly pricing, such a result was justified by "the nature of
the property dealt in."'"10 Appellate courts echoed the view that patent law
surrendered not "one iota" to the Sherman Act."1 '
B. Post-National Harrow Restrictions on Patent Licensing
The "absolute freedom" of patentees to collude through patent pools
ended in 1912. In Standard Sanitary Manufacturing Co. v. United
States, 1 2 the Supreme Court upheld the breakup of a pool of patents
relating to an enameling process for sanitary ironware. The pool in
question, although based upon a set of patents that covered but a minor
part of the manufacturing process, brought 85% of enamelware
manufacturers and 90% of their jobbers into alliance.'1 3 The patent
licenses that bound the firms mandated that participants agree "to adhere
to a minimum sales price, to enforce resale prices, to refuse to sell to
jobbers dealing with unlicensed manufacturers, and to halt the sale of
seconds."" l4 The Court ruled that the rights of the patentees had been
pushed "to evil consequences," and that the Sherman Act imposed
appropriate limits on such abuses."
15
Courts continued to target patent pools as shelters of collusive activity
throughout the 1900S.116 One of the most notorious pools was dismantled
by the Supreme Court in Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States."7 The
glass manufacturing cartel implicated in the case prompted Justice Hugo
Black to write: "The history of this country has perhaps never witnessed a
more completely successful economic tyranny over any field of industry
than that accomplished by these appellants.""'  The cartel was created
through successive pooling and cross-licensing arrangements between all
the major glassware manufacturers, culminating in a horizontal and
vertical integration of most aspects of the glass industry." 9 First, the
contracts keep up the monopoly or fix prices does not render them illegal.").
110 Id. at 93.
IlI Rubber Tire Wheel Co. v. Milwaukee Rubber Works Co., 154 F. 358, 362 (7th Cir. 1907)
("The Sherman law contains no reference to the patent law. Each was passed under a separate and
distinct constitutional grant of power; each was passed professedly to advantage the public; the
necessary implication is not that one iota was taken away from the patent law; the necessary
implication is that patented articles, unless or until they are released by the owner of the patent from
the dominion of his monopoly, are not articles of trade or commerce among the several states.").
112 226 U.S. 20 (1912).
113 See VAUGHAN, supra note 1, at 44-45.
114 Priest, supra note 70, at 334.
115 Standard Sanitary, 226 U.S. at 49.
116 See generally CARL KAYSEN & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY: AN ECONOMIC
AND LEGAL ANALYSIS 164 (1965).
117 323 U.S. 386 (1945). The story of the Hartford-Empire/Owens cartel is told in detail in
VAUGHAN, supra note 1, at 78-84.
118 Hartford-Empire, 323 U.S. at 436-37 (Black, J., dissenting in part).
119 See VAUGHAN, supra note 1, at 78-84.
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patents covering the gob-fed glass-blowing process were pooled into the
Hartford-Empire patent pool. 20 These patents were then cross-licensed
with the patents to the rival glass-blowing process-the suction process. 121
Once the glass-blowing patents were consolidated, the cartel acquired
essentially all patents over gob feeding, forming machines, stackers, and
lehrs.122 At its peak, Hartford-Empire/Owens had amassed over 600
patents. 23 The cartel used its massive patent portfolio to sue competitors
and coerce them to sell out to the pool. 124 As a result, 94% of all glass
manufactured in America was produced under license from Hartford-
Empire/Owens, and prices were sustained at high levels despite improved
technology and the onset of the Great Depression. 25 The Court compelled
the members of the cartel to license their patents at standard royalties
without discrimination or restriction.
26
By the late 1960s, the DOJ's attitude toward patent licensing was
hostile. 27 The Department applied a presumption of market power to the
grant of a patent, and therefore gave no consideration to the structural
characteristics of the markets in which patented products competed.
21
Moreover, it afforded little weight to efficiency considerations of licensing
restrictions. 129 The Department's opposition to patent licensing culminated
in a list of nine practices, referred to as the "Nine No-Nos," that were
considered per se violations of the antitrust laws.
30
Since the announcement of the "Nine No-Nos," patent pools have
120 See id. at 79.
121 See id.
122 See id. at 80.
123 See Hartford-Empire, 323 U.S. at 400.
124 See VAUGHAN, supra note 118, at 80.
125 See id. at 82.
126 See Hartford-Empire, 323 U.S. at 417-35.
127 See IP LICENSING GUIDELINES, supra note 4, at 4.
128 See id. at 5.
129 See id.
130 The Nine No-Nos are:
(i) Requiring a licensee to buy unpatented materials from the licensor;
(ii) Requiring a licensee to assign to the patentee any patent which may be issued to the licensee
after the license agreement is executed;
(iii) Attempting to restrict the purchaser of a patented product in the resale of that product;
(iv) Restricting the licensee's freedom to deal in products or services not within the scope of the
patent;
(v) Agreeing with the licensee that the licensor will not, without the licensee's consent, grant
further licenses to any other person;
(vi) Requiring the licensee to take a package license;
(vii) Requiring the licensee to pay royalties, including total sales royalties, in an amount not
reasonably related to the licensee's sales of products covered by the patent;
(viii) Attempting to restrict a process patent licensee's sales of products made by the patented
process; and
(ix) Requiring a licensee to adhere to any specified or minimum price in its sale of licensed
products.
See Wilson, supra note 5, 50,146.
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been markedly less prevalent in the courts and in other reports. The
number of patent pools cannot be determined with precision because they
are private agreements not typically visible to the public eye. The number
of reported cases involving patent pools has declined precipitously since
the late 1960s. 13 1 The DOJ's aggressive enforcement policy appears to
have chilled the willingness of patentees to collaborate through pooling
and cross-licensing arrangements."'
C. A Resurgence of Patent Pools
The rise in the prominence of patents has brought renewed focus on
patent pools by federal antitrust authorities. In 1995, the DOJ and the FTC
jointly published the first set of guidelines directed expressly to the
antitrust implications of intellectual property licensing arrangements.
33
Additionally, since 1997, both the DOJ and the FTC have ruled upon cases
directly concerning the lawfulness of patent pools. 134 Pooling cases have
resurfaced in Article III courts, as well. 135 Through the guidelines and the
cases coming before them, the DOJ and the FTC are actively designing
standards to evaluate the legality of patent pools. The agencies have a
difficult task of balancing the procompetitive and anticompetitive effects
of these arrangements.
D. The 1995 DOJ/FTC Antitrust Guidelines for Intellectual Property
Licensing
In 1995, the DOJ and the FTC jointly published the Federal Antitrust
Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property (the "Guidelines"). 36
131 The present study identified only a handful of such cases between that time and the early
1990s, and none reached a final verdict on the lawfulness of the challenged pool. See, e.g., Zenith
Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100 (1969) (affirming injunction against American
patentee alleged to have conspired with Canadian patent pool to foreclose rival from Canadian
market); Carpet Seaming Tape Licensing Corp. v. Best Seam, Inc., 616 F.2d 1133 (9th Cir. 1980)
(remanding case to trial court for failure of judge to have considered whether patents implicated in
patent pool were blocking).
132 See Merges, supra note 3, at 1355 ("[Flederal antitrust policy is the most likely
explanation for the small number of patent pools existing today.").
133 See IP LICENSING GUIDELINES, supra note 4. Prior policies were announced in
publications of more general application and in addresses by members of the DOJ. See, e.g.,
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 1988 INTERNATIONAL GUIDELINES (1988), reprinted in JOSEPH P. GRIFFIN,
U.S. INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT
GUIDELINES 101, 101-200 (BNA Corp. Prac. Series Special Rep. 1989); Wilson, supra note 5,
50,146.
134 See Summit Technology Complaint, supra note 55; Klein DVD Letter, supra note 66;
Klein MPEG Letter, supra note 56.
135 See Boston Scientific Corp. v. Schneider, 983 F. Supp. 245 (D. Mass. 1997) (ruling that
existence of cross-licensing arrangement was insufficient to sustain state antitrust claim).
136 See IP LICENSING GUIDELINES, supra note 4.
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The Guidelines advance general principles regarding the interface of
antitrust and intellectual property law, and discuss the antitrust
implications of various licensing practices, such as patent pooling.
1. General Principles
The Guidelines advance three general principles upon which the
remainder of the agencies' discussion is based. In short, these principles
are:
1) for the purposes of antitrust analysis, intellectual property is
regarded as essentially comparable to any other form of
property;
37
2) intellectual property is not presumed to create market power in
the antitrust context; 138 and,
3) intellectual property licensing is recognized to allow firms to
combine complementary factors of production. and is generally
procompetitive.1
39
2. Discussion of Cross-Licensing and Pooling Arrangements
The Guidelines expressly recognize that patent pools and cross-
licensing arrangements can have important procompetitive benefits.' 40 The




1) collective price or output restraints in pooling arrangements that
do not contribute to an efficient integration of economic
activity;1
42
137 See id. at 73-74.
138 See id. at 74-76.
139 See id. at 76-77.
140 See id. at 105 (stating that patent pools and cross-licensing arrangements "may provide
procompetitive benefits by integrating complementary technologies, reducing transaction costs,
clearing blocking positions, and avoiding costly infringement litigation. By promoting the
dissemination of technology, cross-licensing and pooling arrangements are often procompetitive.").
141 These suspect practices have been recognized by the courts. See generally Susan A.
Creighton & Perry J. Narancic, Antitrust Counseling in Intellectual Property Transactions Involving
Competitors, 524 PLI/PAT 489, 503-05 (Pat., Copyright, Trademark & Literary Prop. Course
Handbook Series 1998).
142 See IP LICENSING GUIDELINES, supra note 4, at 105.
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2) settlement agreements that combine intellectual property assets
of horizontal competitors and that have the effect of diminishing
competition; 43
3) exclusion of competitors from a patent pool when the excluded
firms cannot effectively compete in the relevant market, and
when the pool participants collectively possess market power;14
and,
4) pooling arrangements that deter research and development. 45
The Guidelines advance one additional proposition not stated directly
in the text. One of the Guideline's examples asserts that patent pools, and
associated licensing practices, are lawful when they comprise blocking
146patents. Patentees may engage in otherwise prohibited practices, such as
joint setting of royalty rates and package licensing, when the patents
involved in the transaction are blocking. 147 This rule will heretofore be
referred to as "the blocking patents exception."
143 See id.
144 See id. at 106.
145 See id.
146 Example 10 of the Guidelines provides, in full:
Situation: [T]wo of the leading manufacturers of a consumer electronic product
hold patents that cover alternative circuit designs for the product. The
manufacturers assign several of their patents to a separate corporation wholly
owned by the two firms. That corporation licenses the right to use the circuit
designs to other consumer product manufacturers and establishes the license
royalties. [In contrast to the previous example,] the manufacturers assign to the
separate corporation only patents that are blocking. None of the patents assigned
to the corporation can be used without infringing a patent owned by the other firm.
Discussion: Unlike the previous example, the joint assignment of patent rights
to the wholly owned corporation in this example does not adversely affect
competition in the licensed technology among entities that would have been actual
or likely potential competitors in the absence of the licensing arrangement.
Moreover, the licensing arrangement is likely to have procompetitive benefits in
the use of the technology. Because the manufacturers' patents are blocking, the
manufacturers are not in a horizontal relationship with respect to those patents.
None of the patents can be used without the right to a patent owned by the other
firm, so the patents are not substitutable. As in Example 9, the firms are horizontal
competitors in the relevant goods market. In the absence of collateral restraints
that would likely raise price or reduce output in the relevant goods market or in
any other relevant antitrust market and that are not reasonably related to an
efficiency-enhancing integration of economic activity, the evaluating Agency
would be unlikely to challenge this arrangement.
Id. at 107 ex.10.
147 See id.; Telephone Interview with Willard Tom, Deputy Director of Bureau of
Competition, Federal Trade Commission (Dec. 9, 1998) [hereinafter Tom Interview] (stating that
pooled blocking patents may be licensed as a package, and moreover that licensees would not want to
take a license to less than the full package of blocking patents).
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III. Procompetitive Effects of Patent Pools
It is undisputed that patent pools have procompetitive benefits. This
Part summarizes the positive effects associated with patent pools.
A. Clearing Blocking Patents
A primary justification for pooling patents is to clear blocking
patents.148 As discussed above, blocking patents can suppress the
development of technology by giving rival patentees the right to exclude
each other from making, using, or selling the patented technology.
149
Important technologies become blocked under overlapping patent rights
and cannot be freed absent some form of cooperative agreement between
the patentees. The blocking patents problem has long been recognized by
the courts as a justification for the pooling of patents.' 50
This situation has been described by Michael Heller and Rebecca
Eisenberg as the "tragedy of the anticommons."' 5 ' In an anticommons, a
number of rightholders each have the power to exclude others from the
commons, resulting in underutilization of the resource. 2 Heller and
Eisenberg point to biotechnology as an example, and assert that the broad
diffusion of exclusionary rights among patentees has created a situation in
which scientific resources are being fenced off under a growing thicket of
intellectual property rights. 53  Patent pools and cross-licensing
arrangements allow the blocking intellectual property rights to be
combined and licensed jointly. 15 4
B. Facilitating the Rapid Development of Technology
Patent pools are a means of promoting the rapid development of
technologies that are otherwise blocked by patent disputes. For example,
on the eve of World War I, the U.S. government ordered competing firms
to form a pool for those patents relating to aircraft technology in order to
resolve patent disputes that hindered aircraft production. 55 And currently,
the recording industries are pressuring the formation of a pool for MPEG-4
patents to achieve rapid standardization of a protocol for protecting
148 See IP LICENSING GUIDELINES, supra note 4, at 105.
149 See supra Part I.A.1.
150 See Standard Oil (Indiana) v. United States, 283 U.S. 163, 171 (1931); International Mfg.
Co. v. Landon, Inc., 336 F.2d 723, 730 (9th Cir. 1964).
151 Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 698.
152 See id. at 698.
153 See id. at 699.
154 See id. at 700.
155 See Bittlingmayer, supra note 14, at 230-32.
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copyrighted works on the Internet. 156
C. Reducing Litigation Costs
Patent litigation is frequently settled through the creation of a patent
pool or cross-licensing arrangement.' 57 Patent litigation is extremely costly
and uncertain. Roughly $1 billion is spent annually in the United States on
patent litigation, 158 and patent cases have produced some of the largest
damages awards in history.'59 The inherent uncertainty of patent litigation
compounds these costs, as judges and juries are frequently ill equipped to
handle complex technical disputes. 160 Patent litigation is also a risky
prospect because the judge may invalidate the patents of both parties. 61
Rather than risk the time, cost, and uncertainty of patent litigation, firms
frequently choose to settle their disputes through the creation of patent
pools or cross-licensing arrangements. 6 2 This option may be especially
attractive for smaller firms that do not have the resources to litigate an
infringement trial, 163 and for patentees who fear that their patents may be
invalidated in court. 164
D. Promoting Network Externalities
Network effects govern many technologies, especially those related to
communications. 165 Rival developers of communication technology vie to
have their own technology adopted as an industry standard. 166 If the
various technologies can be pooled, the members can settle upon an
embodiment of the technology and each share in its development. The
156 See Strauss, supra note 77. Strategic plans for creation of the MPEG-4 patent pool for
multimedia applications are found at OVERVIEW OF MPEG LA, supra note 78.
157 See ELLIS, supra note 67, § 530. The diaper industry is currently dominated by two firms
that settled lengthy patent litigation through a cross-licensing arrangement. See Parker-Pope, supra
note 71.
158 See Josh Lerner, Patenting in the Shadow of Competitors, 38 J.L. & ECON. 463, 470
(1995).
159 Kodak, for example, paid $925 million in damages to Polaroid in settlement fees. See
Kodak Settles with Polaroid, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 1991, at D8.
160 See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 388-89 (1996) (questioning
capability ofjury to interpret patent claims properly).
161 Cf United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174, 177 n.2 (1963) (citing internal memo
discussing strategy of avoiding litigation for fear of cancellation of patents).
162 See id.
163 See Crypto Pool, supra note 24.
164 See WARD S. BOWMAN, JR., PATENT AND ANTITRUST LAW: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
APPRAISAL 201 (1973). One example of a patent pool that incorporated an allegedly invalid patent and
sheltered it from litigation is the Pillar Point Partners pool over laser eye surgery techniques. See
Summit Technology Complaint, supra note 55.
165 See generally Lemley, supra note 101.
166 See Kelly Flaherty, Standard Operating Procedure, RECORDER, Dec. 17, 1997, at 1.
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MPEG-2 patent pool over digital compression technology, 167 and the
Public Key Partners pool over public key encryption technology168 are two
such examples.
E. Resolving Uncertainties in the Scope of Patent Claims
Patent claims are notoriously difficult to interpret. Claim construction
(i.e., a court's interpretation of patent claims) is an especially problematic
area of law. 69 In Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,tT7 the Supreme
Court removed this task from the province of the jury, making claim
construction a matter of law for the judge alone to decide. Nonetheless, it
is "astounding how many things are still unsettled."' 7'' Trial judges have
little guidance on the degree of specificity for interpreting the patent's
claims. 72 And new classes of patents-such as those for algorithms, data
structures, and genetic materials-present novel issues of claim
construction. 73 By resolving patent disputes through a patent pool or
cross-licensing arrangement, patentees can avoid the guesswork related to
the scope of their intellectual property rights.
F. Distributing Risks Among Members of a Pool
Patent pools provide an incentive to innovate by creating a
mechanism for participants to share the risks and benefits of technology
ventures. Pooling spreads royalties among the various firms that invest to
produce a successful invention. 74 The pools increase the probability that
each participant will recoup investments made in the development of its
respective technologies. 175 This theory of pool formation suggests that
patent pools would be observed with greatest frequency in fields such as
167 See Klein MPEG Letter, supra note 56.
168 The two early firms in the public key encryption market, RSA and Cylink, each held
blocking patents over this technology. They entered into a patent infringement suit, but resolved their
dispute through formation of a patent pool, Public Key Partners. See Crypto Pool, supra note 24.
Having settled their own infringement claim, they were able to unite against, and defeat, the
development of an inferior standard being advanced by the federal government. See Digital Signature,
supra note 22.
169 See Michel, supra note 44, 5-10.
170 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
171 Michel, supra note 44, 5.
172 See id.
173 See Richard H. Stem, On Defining the Concept of Infringement of Intellectual Property
Rights in Algorithms and Other Abstract Computer-Related Ideas, 23 AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS'N
QJ. 401, 412-13 (1995) ("The concept of infringement of legal rights in abstract ideas deserves study,
therefore, because protecting such rights raises issues neither previously addressed nor thought
through.").
174 See Maria Luisa Petit & Boleslaw Tolwinski, Technology Sharing Cartels and Industrial
Structure, 15 INT'L J. INDUS. ORG. 77, 80 (1996); Priest, supra note 70, at 359-60.
175 See Petit & Tolwinski, supra note 174, at 78.
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biotechnology, where risks of failure and potential payoffs are high.' 76 The
fact that patent pools are observed more frequently in the electronics
market suggests that risk reduction is a secondary motivation of pool
formation. 1
77
G. Promoting the Success of Smaller Firms
Litigation costs are generally higher for smaller firms. 78 Patent pools
and cross-licensing arrangements provide settlement options that increase
smaller firms' chances of survival alongside larger firms. 17 9 The MPEG
LA patent pool, for example, incorporates patents from fourteen different
licensors. 80 Dominant firms conceivably would have driven smaller firms
from the MPEG market if a patent pool did not present an alternative to
litigation.
H. Countering Spillover Effects
Spillover effects are a disincentive to innovation. i18  When a firm
invests in research and development, a certain amount of knowledge
"spills out" of the firm into the public domain, benefiting competitors. 8 2
Since a firm cannot internalize all its research and development
investments, firms are less likely to engage in such activities. 3 Patent
pools, however, mitigate spillover effects by ensuring that each member is
both a producer and recipient of each others' information.18 4
I. Conclusion
Antitrust authorities are justified in approving the formation of patent
pools where procompetitive benefits are compelling. It is undeniable that
patent rights are formidable obstacles to the development of technology,
176 See Ralph T. King, What Bull Market? A Biotech Investor Never Quits Trying, WALL ST.
J., Jan. 5, 1999, at Al.
177 This study identified four patent pools, three of which relate to the
electfonics/communications industry. These pools include the following: the MPEG LA patent pool for
technology relating to the MPEG protocol, see Klein MPEG Letter, supra note 56; the Public Key
Partners patent pool for technology relating to technology for public key encryption, see Crypto Pool,
supra note 24; and the DVD patent pool for technology relating to Digital Versatile Discs (DVDs), see
Klein DVD Letter, supra note 66. The fourth patent pool identified by this study collects patents
relating to laser eye surgery. See Summit Technology Complaint, supra note 55.
178 See Lemer, supra note 158, at 472.
179 See, e.g., United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours, 351 U.S. 377, 420 (1956) (Warren,
C.J., dissenting).
180 See OVERVIEW OF MPEG LA, supra note 78.
181 See Petit & Tolwinski, supra note 174, at 81.
182 See id. at 78.
183 See id.
184 Seeid. at 81.
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and that an accommodating regulatory policy toward patent pools is
justified. The DOJ and the FTC, however, risk reviving the
anticompetitive abuses of the past if they give undue deference to patents.
IV. Social Costs of Patent Pools
While patent pools and cross-licensing agreements do have
procompetitive benefits, overly permissive treatment of these
arrangements would invite a resurgence of the patent cartels that
dominated American industry for much of this century. Even blocking
patents, the kind of patents most worthy of pooling arrangements, pose the
risk of substantial harm to consumers if allowed to be pooled without
qualification. This Part discusses the anticompetitive hazards of patent
pools. The question of blocking patents is discussed first to challenge the
accepted notion that pools of blocking patents are necessarily
procompetitive. It then discusses the more complicated anticompetitive
effects of broader pools, such as the MPEG LA patent pool. Finally, this
Part argues that the DOJ and the FTC should not adopt a per se rule of
legality for the pooling of blocking patents, and that they must carefully
stipulate the permissible bounds of those pools deemed procompetitive.
A. Anticompetitive Effects of Pools of Blocking Patents
Judges, regulators, and academics have widely endorsed the
proposition that pools of blocking patents are procompetitive. 185 Most
recently, this position was expressly adopted by the DOJ and the FTC in
the 1995 Federal Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual
Property. 86 The Guidelines condone the pooling of blocking patents under
the theory that such pools "do[] not adversely affect competition."' 87
According to the Guidelines, blocked patents cannot be used without
infringing another patent, and they are not substitutable assets. The
patentees, then, are "not in a horizontal relationship with respect to those
patents.' 88 The Guidelines state that even when the patentees are
horizontal competitors in the relevant goods market, the DOJ and the FTC
would be unlikely to challenge a pooling or cross-licensing arrangement
involving these patents, because the patents could not otherwise be
lawfully utilized. 189 The Guidelines, moreover, would permit joint setting
185 See, e.g., Standard Oil (Indiana) v. United States, 283 U.S. 163, 171 (1931); International
Mfg. Co. v. Landon, 336 F.2d 723, 730 (9th Cir. 1964); IP LICENSING GUIDELINES, supra note 4, at
107 ex. 10; Bittlingmayer, supra note 14, at 229.
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of royalty rates in the case of pools of blocking patents.' 90
The intellectual history of the Guidelines' policy toward blocking
patents traces back to Ward Bowman and his frequently cited comment
that pools of blocking patents are "indistinguishable from a vertical
merger."' 9' In full, Bowman wrote:
If. . . one patent was subservient to the other, an improvement
patent unusable without infringing the basic patent, then
combining or pooling them eliminates no user alternative. In terms
of possible trade restraint, this case is indistinguishable from a
vertical merger. The two patents combined ... could not restrict
output or raise price any more than if the two were exploited
separately. 192
The claim that this combination is essentially vertical does hold in
perfect markets. In the Bowman model, the improvement patent
must be "unusable without infringing the basic patent."' 19 The
holder of the improvement patent is foreclosed from marketing his
technology absent some licensing agreement with the pioneer.
194
The improver may license the full value of his invention to the
pioneer, or the pioneer may license the full value of her invention to
the improver, or the two patentees may cross-license or pool their
patents and award a certain sum of money to the party with the
better invention. 195 In the Bowman model, the improver cannot
market his invention without some form of permission from the
pioneer, and barring such an agreement, the consumer has no choice
but to purchase the unimproved version from the pioneer.' 96 The
consumer loses no alternatives if the improver's and pioneer's
patents are pooled. 1
97
Bowman's model depends upon two key assumptions: (1) the
improver refrains from marketing his invention absent proper legal
rights; and (2) the bargaining process between the parties is perfect.
Unfortunately, neither of these suppositions holds outside a perfect
market.
First, holders of blocked patents frequently do market their
190 See id.




195 See Priest, supra note 70, at 356-58 (stating that the proper royalty in a cross-licensing
scheme would be equal to the "net relative advantage of one of the patents over the other").
196 See BOWMAN, supra note 164, at 201.
197 See IP LICENSING GUIDELINES, supra note 4, at 107 ex.10.
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products. 198 Firms may openly produce goods that infringe others'
patents, either because infringement suits are not brought,' 99 or
because production of the accused product continues while litigation
is pending. 200 Most infringed patents are not worth defending in
court, as they earn their holders no profits above competitive
levels. 2°  Even in the pharmaceutical industry, where patents are
most valuable, eight out of ten patents typically produce no value for
their holders. 20 2 Thus, goods covered by valid patents are commonly
sold at competitive prices and legitimate legal claims are frequently
not litigated.
Second, the bargaining process between an improver and a
pioneer is rife with friction. Transaction costs are rooted in the
notion that patents are extremely hard to value, and that it is difficult
to determine the respective contributions of the two patentees to the
production of the underlying technology. 23 Furthermore, the
problems of bilateral monopoly further complicate any bargaining
situation, as each patentee has the unilateral power to prevent the
other party from marketing its products. 20 4 Bargaining difficulties
may be particularly acute in the widespread instances where firms
procure patents for the purpose of blocking the patenting strategies
of their competitors.
20 5
The upshot is that patentees who are blocked in a legal sense are not
necessarily blocked as a matter of fact. They frequently sell their products,
and often do so at competitive prices. The landmark case of Standard Oil
(Indiana) v. United States206 supports the three key propositions that (1)
holders of blocked patents do market their goods; (2) patented goods do
sell at competitive levels; and (3) pools are an effective mechanism for
198 See infra notes 206-208 and accompanying text.
199 Patentees often will not bring infringement suits unless at least $2 million is at stake for
damages. See Dennis M. Ritchie et al., The Continued Debate on Software Patents, COMM. OF THE
ACM, June 1992, at 13.
200 The Standard Oil litigation over blocking patents covering processes related to petroleum
cracking, for example, lasted fifteen years, during which time the respective parties continued to use
their processes. See John S. McGee, Patent Exploitation: Some Economic and Legal Problems, 9 J.L.
& ECON. 135, 153 (1966).
201 See FTC Testimony, supra note 74, at 7 (statement of F.M. Scherer).
202 See id.
203 See Merges, supra note 61, at 75.
204 See id. at 83. Merges cites the example of well documented bargaining breakdowns in the
area of oil field unitization, showing that "despite the sizable gains that could be realized from this
efficient contractual solution, private unitization contracting was generally ineffective." Id. at 83-84
(citing Steven N. Wiggins & Gary D. Libecap, Oil Field Unitization: Contractual Failure in the
Presence of Imperfect Information, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 368 (1985)). From the domain of patent
history, Merges recites the bargaining impasse reached by Marconi and De Forest over blocking
patents in the early radio industry. See id. at 84-87.
205 See Cohen et al., supra note 50, at 21.
206 283 U.S. 163 (1931).
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restoring monopoly prices.2°7 If, as in Standard Oil, patents covering
competitively priced goods are allowed to be brought under unitary
control, monopoly profits can be restored.20 8
The principles articulated in the 1995 Guidelines raise the prospect
that pools of blocking patents will inflate the cost of competitively priced
goods. Blocked patents are common throughout industry. 209 The goods
they cover, moreover, are frequently competitively priced. 210  The
Guidelines state that holders of blocked patents are free to pool their
intellectual property."' The Guidelines thus open a broad shelter for firms
to pool their patents and jointly to set the licensing rate for their patents.
When patents have been blocked both in a legal and in a factual sense, the
Guidelines' rule is procompetitive by definition. But where patents that are
legally blocking, but factually competitive, are pooled, the pool provides a
direct means for restoring monopoly prices to a competitive market.
Therefore, the DOJ and the FTC should not adopt a per se rule of legality
for the pooling of blocking patents.
B. Shielding Invalid Patents from Litigation
One of the greatest dangers of patent pools is that they shelter invalid
patents from litigation. Patentees have strong incentives to settle when
they fear that their patents will be invalidated through litigation. Such
settlements are commonly effectuated by creating patent pools or cross-
licensing arrangements. 1 2 These arrangements may be especially effective
at preserving invalid patents when the settlement partner is one of the few
parties sufficiently interested to challenge the patent, as is the case in
207 In that case, the patented Burton process for cracking petroleum had accounted for 100%
of cracked gasoline output from 1913 through 1919, drawing in approximately $90 million for that
period. See McGee, supra note 200, at 151; Priest, supra note 70, at 365. As rival patented processes
arose, the market share of the Burton process slipped to 90% by 1922, and to 9% by 1929. See McGee,
supra note 200, at 151. Patent litigation ensued between the various processes, with the four dominant
firms resolving the litigation in the early 1920s through the execution of cross-licensing agreements.
See id. at 153. The Supreme Court condoned the agreements as a legitimate means to clear the
blocking positions created by the patents and to reduce litigation costs. See Standard Oil (Indiana),
283 U.S. at 171 n.5. Scholars have subsequently reviewed the case and concluded that the agreements
possibly disguised a cartel that permitted the firms to fix royalty rates. See McGee, supra note 204, at
158; see also Priest, supra note 70, at 364-76.
208 See McGee, supra note 200, at 144.
209 See Cohen et al., supra note 50, at 16 (providing empirical evidence that American
patents are often procured to block the patenting strategies of competitors); Gilbert & Newbery, supra
note 50, at 514-15.
210 See FTC Testimony, supra note 74, at 7.
211 See IP LICENSING GUIDELINES, supra note 4, at 107 ex.10.
212 See, e.g., United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 419-20 (1956);
see also United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174, 177 n.2 (1963) (citing internal
communications of sewing machine manufacturer stating that, as alternative to risky litigation whereby
patents may be invalidated, it would be preferable to pool patents by mutual agreement with rival);
Parker-Pope, supra note 71 (discussing cross-licensing strategies of diaper industry).
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oligopoly markets. 1 3 Once invalid patents are pooled with those of rival
industries, the other members of the pool lose the incentive to challenge
the patent and to preserve "an open fight over validity.' '214 Moreover,
licensees will be less likely to attempt to invalidate a suspect patent once it
is incorporated into a larger pool, either due to the heightened costs of
litigation or due to the deterioration of their long-term relationship with the
pool.2 5  Therefore, patent pools are likely to contain invalid and/or
unenforceable patents that licensees will be compelled to accept. The
Supreme Court as early as 1892 rebuffed the practice of licensing invalid
patents, proclaiming: "It is as important to the public that competition
should not be repressed by worthless patents, as that the patentee of a
really valuable invention should be protected in his monopoly. 216
In 1998, the FTC challenged a patent pool for sheltering a bogus
patent.217 The Summit Technology complaint involved a patent pool, Pillar
Points Partners, containing twenty-five patents relating to laser eye surgery
techniques.218 The members of the pool-Summit Technology, Inc. and
VISX, Inc.-would have sued each other for patent litigation but for the
creation of the pool. 219 VISX had been involved in patent interference
proceedings prior to the pooling arrangement, wherein it was alleged that
VISX had obtained its patents through fraud and inequitable conduct on
the Patent and Trademark Office.220  VISX and Summit Technology
contended that they pooled their patents in order to reduce the uncertainty
213 For example, the two firms with patents over a novel laser eye surgery technique pooled
their patents in 1992. See Summit Technology Complaint, supra note 55. The firms would probably
have sued one another for patent infringement, but for the formation of the patent pool. See FEDERAL
TRADE COMM'N, ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED CONSENT ORDER TO AID PUBLIC COMMENT: SUMMIT
TECHNOLOGY, INC. (visited Mar. 10, 1999) <http://www.ftc.gov/os/1998/9808/dO9286ana.htm>
[hereinafter SUMMIT TECHNOLOGY ANALYSIS]. Because they were the only two suppliers of this
technique, the creation of the pool effectively neutralized the most proper plaintiffs for challenging the
validity of the patents. In the end, the FTC brought suit. See id.
214 United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174, 199 (1963) (White, J., concurring)
("Singer and Gegauf agreed to settle an interference, at least in part, to prevent an open fight over
validity. There is a public interest here which the parties have subordinated to their private ends.")
(citations omitted); Creighton & Naransic, supra note 141, at 508-09 (quoting Joel Klein); see also
BOWMAN, supra note 164, at 201 ("Not litigating ... can be cost-saving to the parties but costly to the
community if invalid claims are established."). One example of a patent pool that incorporated an
allegedly invalid patent and sheltered it from litigation is the Pillar Point Partners pool over laser eye
surgery techniques. See SUMMIT TECHNOLOGY ANALYSIS, supra note 213.
215 As a pool grows, litigation costs decline making it more likely that a pool will enter into
sustained litigation against an outside firm over a patent dispute. See Lemer, supra note 158, at 472
(asserting that large firms have smaller litigation costs than small firms).
216 Pope Mfg. Co. v. Gormully, 144 U.S. 224, 234 (1892).
217 See Summit Technology Complaint, supra note 55.
218 See id. 8.
219 See SUMMIT TECHNOLOGY ANALYSIS, supra note 213.
220 See Summit Technology Complaint, supra note 55, 14-21. VISX had allegedly
fabricated, back-dated, and falsified its scientific records in order to earn an earlier priority date for its
patents. See id. 18.
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and expense of litigation that would have inevitably followed.221 Rejecting
this defense, the FTC proposed a consent order dissolving the pool and
compelling the firms to cross-license their patents royalty-free.222 The FTC
continued to prosecute VISX for fraud on the PTO, with litigation still
pending as of March 1999.
C. Elimination of Competition
Patent pools also harm the market by bringing horizontal competitors
into collusion. This risk is particularly pronounced when firms hold
patents to competing processes or products.223 The pool effectuates a
horizontal merger of the two firms and allows them jointly to set royalty
rates for their patents. This mechanism allows firms to restore monopoly
prices to an otherwise competitive market. 24
This potential for monopoly provided the FTC an additional ground
for attacking the Pillar Point Partners patent pool over laser eye surgery
techniques.225 The two participants in the patent pool were the only firms
in the United States that had received marketing approval by the Food and
Drug Administration for performing their patented techniques.226 As a
result, the firms were horizontal competitors in this duopoly market.227
This arrangement, as alleged by the FTC, permitted the participants to
"raise, fix, stabilize and maintain the price that physicians must pay to
perform [laser eye surgery] procedures., 228
D. Package Licensing
Pools of blocking patents also raise the problem of package licensing.
The DOJ and the FTC state that they would permit members of a pool of
blocking patents to bundle their patents and to license them as a
package.229 The agencies justify this policy under the understanding that if
the pool comprises only blocking patents, then a licensee would want no
less than the full complement of licenses, lest he be liable for infringement
under any patents to which he does not take a license.230 By permitting the
221 See SUMMIT TECHNOLOGY ANALYSIS, supra note 213.
222 See id.
223 See Klein DVD Letter, supra note 66; McGee, supra note 200, at 144-45.
224 See McGee, supra note 200, at 144.-45.
225 See Summit Technology Complaint, supra note 55, 1 8-13.
226 See id. 6.
227 See SUMMIT TECNOLOGY ANALYSIS, supra note 219.
228 Summit Technology Complaint, supra note 55, Count 1.
229 See IP Licensing Guidelines, supra note 4, at 107 ex.10; Tom Interview, supra note 147.
230 This scenario played out in the case of the pool of the patents to public key encryption.
RSA, the holder of a subservient patent on public key encryption technology, licensed its products
widely and later pooled its patents with those of the dominant patentee, Cylink. RSA's licensees did
not acquire licensees to Cylink's patents, despite their blocking nature. When the pool dissolved,
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bundling of blocking patents into a single package, the policy assures that
the licensee will acquire the rights to all patents that cover his technology.
The policy echoes the holding of the Ninth Circuit in the case of
International Manufacturing Co. v. Landon.23' When considering the
legality of package licensing of blocking patents, the Landon Court stated:
"In such a case, the prospective licensee is being compelled to accept no
more than he would, in any event, have to obtain in order to make
worthwhile a license under any of the patents. 232
The consumer will not be harmed under this arrangement so long as
three conditions are met regarding the nature of the pool: (1) that all the
patents in the pool are mutually blocking; (2) that all the patents contained
in the package are essential for every prospective licensee; and (3) that all
the patents are valid and enforceable. However, if these conditions are not
met, then consumer harm may result from the requirement to purchase all
the pool's patents in a bundle.
First, the model assumes that all patents in the pool are mutually
blocking. If so, then a licensee would be required to accept rights to all of
the pool's patents in order to develop underlying technology. The phrase
"a pool of blocking patents," however, is ambiguous. Is this label limited
to instances in which all the patents are mutually blocking, or does it refer
to situations in which all the patents in the pool are blocked by one or
more of the other patents, but not by all the other patents? Patent pools are
likely to resemble the latter scenario. Consider a simple pool comprised of
a single dominant patent, X, and two subservient improvement patents, Y
and Z. By definition, X is mutually blocked by both Y and Z. But a
consumer developing technology covered by Y, for example, may not
require a license to Z. Although the pool in this case is comprised solely of
blocking patents (i.e., each patent is blocked by at least one other patent in
the pool), licensees may not require rights to all the patents. If compelled
to accept a package license for all the patents in the pool, the licensee is
required to take title to patents for which he has no use.
Second, the model assumes that all prospective licensees will seek
rights to the same patents. Accordingly, a single pool of patents can be
licensed in a bundle to all licensees. Different licensees, however, will
have different demands. In the above example, some licensees may be
developing products covered by both improvement patents Y and Z, while
Cylink threatened to sue all RSA's licensees. Had the licensees of RSA acquired licenses to all
blocking patents, the subsequent disruption would have been precluded. See Crypto Pool, supra note
24 ("Until the fight [between Cylink and RSA] began, the RSA algorithm was fast becoming the de
facto industry standard for encryption. Companies like Microsoft, Apple, Novell, and Lotus all employ
RSA technology in their products. Now, all bets are off on the pace of paperless transactions. There is
nothing like a heated patent dispute to chill the waters of commerce in an emerging industry.").
231 336 F.2d 723 (9th Cir. 1964).
232 Id. at 730.
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other licensees' technologies are covered by only Y or Z. By permitting
pools to bundle their patents and license them in a one-size-fits-all
package, licensees will be required to accept extraneous patents.
Third, the model assumes that all patents are valid and enforceable.
As such, prospective licensees would require rights to all the pool's
patents. As described above, this assumption is dangerous. 3 If patent
pools are permitted to bundle their patents and license them as a package,
invalid patents increasingly will be permitted to extract rents from
licensees.
1. An Example of Package Licensing-The MPEG LA Patent Pool
Each of the concerns discussed above is present in the MPEG LA
patent pool. MPEG LA gained DOJ approval under its pledge to limit the
pool to essential patents covering the core technology of MPEG-2.234
However, the bounds of this pool are indeterminate. When the pool was
originally formed, twenty-seven patents were deemed to be "most, but not
all, of the Essential Patents. 235 Within less than two years, the number of
U.S. patents nearly doubled to forty-six, with hundreds of foreign patents
incorporated as well.236 As the patent pool expands, the relation between
the patents becomes more attenuated. The twenty-seven original patents
might have been readily categorized as blocking and/or complementary.
The rapid growth of the pool, however, suggests that patents being
incorporated may be blocking or complementary to certain of the pool's
patents, but not blocking or complementary to the pool as a whole. As the
patent pool grows, it runs the risk of losing cohesion and incorporating
patents over products that would compete with the pooled technologies.
Patent pools are especially difficult to define in areas of rapid
technological advance, such as the MPEG protocol. The MPEG LA patent
pool contains patents limited to the MPEG-2 protocol for digital broadcast
television technology. 237 The MPEG-4 protocol is now being developed
for multimedia applications on the Internet.23' As digital television and the
Internet become competing media formats, these two sets of patents can
themselves be classified as competing.239 Many of the patents essential to
233 See supra notes 212-222 and accompanying text.
234 See Klein MPEG Letter, supra note 56.
235 Id. at 2.
236 See OVERVIEW OF MPEG LA, supra note 78 (counting U.S. patents and reissue patents,
and excluding expired patents).
237 See MPEG HOME PAGE, supra note 77.
238 See id.
239 Studies show that the Internet is competing with television for viewership. America
Online, for example, is competing successfully with MTV and CNN for prime time audiences. See
Richard Tedesco, Audience Will Be Well Dispersed by 2000: TV Viewers Will Increasingly Migrate to
Online Attractions, BROAD. & CABLE, Sept. 29, 1997, at 30.
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the MPEG-2 protocol, however, are also essential to the MPEG-4
protocol.240 This suggests that developers of Internet-based applications
requiring licenses to MPEG-4 patents will be required to take license to
some, if not all, of the MPEG-2 patents. The result is that the advance of
technology blurs the cohesion of a closely related patent pool and
introduces competing patents into the fold.
As the pool expands, licensees will be required to accept rights to
unwanted patents. The MPEG-4 protocol provides a powerful example of
this problem. 241 The MPEG-4 protocol will underpin numerous different
applications on the Internet, with each application requiring licenses to a
distinct set of patents. 242 If a global MPEG-4 patent portfolio is formed,
such as that for MPEG-2 patents, then licensees will be required to take
title to extraneous patents. MPEG LA has advanced three proposals for
dealing with this problem, but each raises difficult pricing issues.
243
Bogus patents further complicate the MPEG LA package licensing
scheme. The Licensing Administrator does not evaluate the validity of
patents prior to their inclusion in the pool.244 The DOJ, in addressing the
concern of invalid patents, stated only that the provisions of the pooling
agreement "seem designed to reduce the likelihood that the Licensors
might act concertedly to keep invalid or non-essential patents in the
Portfolio. ''245 The Licensing Administrator, moreover, will only eliminate
a patent from the pool when one of the patentees contributing patents to
the pool declares the patent to be invalid, or upon a final court
adjudication.246 Striking a patent from the pool, then, requires a member of
the pool to profess to the invalidity of the patent, or requires a court to
enter final judgment, striking the patent as invalid or unenforceable. It can
be expected that licensees of the pool will be reluctant to sue to invalidate
240 See M. Miyanaga, Establishing Joint Licensing of MPEG-4 Essential Patents (visited
Apr. 4, 1999) <http://www.mpegla.com/mpeg4/meetings.html> ("It should be also noted that some of
MPEG-2 patents which have been successfully licensed by MPEG LA should be also essential for
MPEG-4 because of its common basis in principal.").
241 There currently is no MPEG-4 analogue to the MPEG LA patent pool for the MPEG-2
protocol. This pool is expected to be formed soon. See Miyanaga, supra note 240; Strauss, supra note
77.
242 See Miyanaga, supra note 240 ("In MPEG-4, there seems to appear many types of
product that use various combination profiles. Namely, it is possible that the MPEG-4 product on the
market uses different combinations of essential patents product by product.").
243 Miyanaga explained three potential royalty schemes for MPEG-4 patents: (1) creation of
a menu of royalty schemes for each possible tool, or application, that could implement the MPEG
protocol; (2) pricing of the royalties based on the number of patents actually used; or (3) establishment
of a fixed royalty for licensees, to be divided up between licensors according the value of each
licensor's patents. See id. Miyanaga states that each approach creates either high transaction costs,
inequities to the licensees, or inequities to the licensors. See id.
244 The duties of the Licensing Administrator are limited to determining the essentiality of
the patents to be included in the pool. See Klein MPEG Letter, supra note 56.
245 Klein MPEG Letter, supra note 56.
246 See MPEG-2 Patent Portfolio License, supra note 86, § 7.6.2.
Yale Journal on Regulation
individual patents held by the pool, given the likely litigation resources of
the pool and the long-term contractual relations between the licensees and
the pool. The result is that the patent pool is likely to shelter defective
patents from adversarial scrutiny, and to require licensees to pay royalties
for patents that would otherwise be declared invalid.
2. An Efficient Pricing Mechanism?
Package licensing has been justified in other contexts as an efficient
pricing mechanism.247 Particularly when dealing with products whose
value is uncertain and when parties lack information on the quality of the
products, package licensing is seen as an efficient way of setting an
average price. 248 This approach has been endorsed, for example, in the
movie distribution market.249 Rather than expending resources to price
each item exactly, sellers can aggregate the goods into a package and set
one price for the entire package. Although some goods in the package will
be overpriced, others will be underpriced. This approach suggests an
efficient pricing mechanism for a pool of blocking patents. Patents are
notoriously difficult assets to price, and a large information gap separates
the buyer and seller.250 Faced with the impossibility of determining the
exact price of each patent, a reasonable solution is to estimate the average
value of the patents and to set one price for the pool of patents.
The problem with package licensing of patents is that prospective
licensees may have no alternative but to transact with the patent pool.
When there are competing processes, with each covered by different sets
of patents, licensees may shop between technologies. 25 1 However, in
standard-dependent technologies, such as the MPEG protocol, there is
essentially no choice but to deal with the patent pool. A prospective
licensee cannot forego dealings with one patent pool in order to trade with
a second. The essential patents, in the rubric of Jefferson Parish Hospital
District No. 2 v. Hyde,2 2 confer market power upon the pool.253 If a pool
247 See Roy W. Kenney & Benjamin Klein, The Economics of Block Booking, 26 J.L. &
ECON. 497, 497 (1983).
248 See id. at 500.
249 See THOMAS D. MORGAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON MODERN ANTITRUST LAW AND
ITS ORIGINS 361 (1994); see also Kenny & Klein, supra note 247, at 500.
250 See A.W. Beggs, The Licensing of Patents Under Asymmetric Information, 10 INT'L J.
INDUS. ORG. 171, 171-72 (1992); Nancy T. Gallini & Brian D. Wright, Technology Transfer Under
Asymmetric Information, 21 RAND J. ECON. 147, 147-49 (1990).
251 In the glass manufacturing industry, for example, glass could be blown through the
suction process or the gob-fed process. Patent pools covered each of these processes. These two
processes remained in competition until they merged through a cross-licensing arrangement. See
VAUGHAN, supra note 1, at 78-80; see also Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 393-
401 (1945).
252 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
253 See id. at 13-14 ("[W]e have condemned typing arrangements when the seller has some
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has market power and includes unwanted patents, then the pool could
likely be found to be in violation of the Sherman Act by "restrain[ing]
competition on the merits by forcing purchases that would not otherwise
be made. 254
Pools should be allowed to sell package licenses to patents that are
truly blocking.55 If the patents are found not to be blocking, then package
licensing constitutes misuse of the patent. As the Third Circuit stated in
American Security Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp. :256
Mandatory package licensing is no more than the exercise of the
power created by a particular patent monopoly to condition the
licensing of that patent upon the acceptance of another patent but
that is too much. The protection, or monopoly, which is given to
the first patent stops where the monopoly of the second begins.257
The fact-specific nature of patents, however, complicates any attempt to
create a blanket rule towards package licensing. As described above,
creating a pool of blocking patents becomes impossible when the number
of relevant patents is relatively large.
E. Establishing Proprietary Standards
Patent pools pose particular problems in standard-dependent
industries. There is tremendous debate today over whether Internet
standards should be proprietary or open.258 When a technology is covered
by intellectual property rights, standard setting organizations will often
reject that technology from consideration for the standardization process,
even if that technology is superior. 259 It is argued that standards should be
free, and that standard setting organizations should not be in the business
special ability-usually called 'market power'-to force a purchaser to do something that he would not
do in a competitive market.").
254 Id. at 27.
255 See International Mfg. Co. v. Landon, 336 F.2d 723, 730 (9th Cir. 1964) (rejecting the
argument that "mandatory package licensing of blocking patents should not be condoned because it
may result in a prospective licensee being compelled to accept an entire license package").
256 268 F.2d 769 (3rd Cir. 1959).
257 Id. at 777.
258 See generally Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network
Economic Effects, 86 CAL. L. REv. 479 (1998); Lawrence Lessig, Open Code and Open Societies:
Values of Internet Governance, 1999 Sibley Lecture at the University of Georgia (Feb. 16, 1999)
(visited Apr. 15. 1999) <http://cyber.harvard.edu/works/lessig/kent.pd'>.
259 A director of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), a prominent standard setting
organization, reportedly said that "no protocol that depends on proprietary technology would ever
become a standard endorsed by the IETF." Jim Kerstetter, RSA Opens Up S/MIME, PC WK., Sept. I,
1997, at 8 (citing JeffSchiller, IETF Security Director).
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of validating monopolies.26 °
Patent pools permit patentees to dominate a technology and to
develop de facto standards absent the approval of standard setting
organizations. 26' By pooling their patents and settling their legal
differences, patentees can collectively promote a single proprietary
standard. The public key encryption industry provides a good example.
Patentees RSA and Cylink each held early patents to public key
cryptography.2 62 They sued each other for patent infringement, but settled
the dispute by pooling their patents into a common entity, Public Key
Partners. 63 As the two private firms were commercializing their
proprietary protocol, the federal government was developing a related
protocol to be released to the public domain.264 RSA and Cylink, having
settled their mutual disputes, focused their litigation on the federal
government.265 The government relinquished, and the RSA proprietary
standard became the de facto standard for industry, with over two-thirds of
the computer industry, as measured by revenue, licensing the proprietary
standard by 1992.266
Standard setting organizations, nonetheless, continued to refuse to
adopt a proprietary standard for public key encryption. In the late 1990s,
the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) attempted to set an encryption
standard for email communications. 267 The RSA protocol was the de facto
standard, but the IETF refused to embrace it because of its proprietary
nature.268 Pressured by the IETF, RSA agreed to surrender many of its
intellectual property rights to its technology.269 Unconvinced that all its
260 See Kelly Jackson Higgins, The Squeeze Is On at IETF, INTERNETWK., Nov. 3, 1997, at
67 (quoting Charles Breed, co-chair of the OpenPGP working group and director of technology at
Pretty Good Privacy).
261 The Public Key Partners patent pool, for example, allowed two rival firms to settle their
legal disputes and to jointly establish their public key cryptography method as an industry standard,
absent endorsement from a standard setting organization. See supra notes 21-30 and accompanying
text.
262 For a description of public key cryptography, see supra notes 21-30 and accompanying
text.
263 See Crypto Pool, supra note 24.
264 See Digital Signature, supra note 22.
265 See Ellen Messmer, Govt Backs Off on DSS Patent Battle, NETWORK WORLD, July 19,
1993, at 9; Taft, supra note 27.
266 See Taft, supra note 27..
267 See Higgins, supra note 264; IETF Meets to Establish S/MIME Group; RSA Shunned,
COMPUTERGRAM INT'L, Nov. 6, 1997.
268 See Secure E-Mail Standards Face Off, COMPUTER SHOPPER, Jan. 1998, at 365 ("[T]he
group has all but ruled out S/MIME [RSA's protocol] as a candidate for approval."); see also Kelly
Flaherty, Standard Operating Procedure, THE RECORDER, Dec. 17, 1997, at 1; RSA Pushes S/MIME
Standardization: 'Not So Fast'Says IETF Committee, ELEC. MESSAGING NEWS, Nov. 12, 1997.
269 See Flaherty, supra note 268 ("In order to hold on to the standard, RSA was forced to
write a formal letter to the IETF agreeing to make public its proprietary 'RC2' algorithm. The
company also relinquished its trademark rights to S/MIME and agreed not to dominate the working
group in charge of developing the standard."); Kerstetter, supra note 259.
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intellectual property rights were abandoned, the IETF rebuffed RSA.27 °
When Cylink's pioneer patent lapsed into the public domain in 1997, the
IETF adopted this technique for its secure email standard, dropping the
RSA standard.27' RSA has faced further difficulties due to the emergence
of novel, competing technologies.2 2 The history of RSA shows that the
standard setting process is a powerful mechanism for forcing firms to
abandon their intellectual property and for promoting the establishment of
open standards for network protocols.
Patent pools, however, permit holders of intellectual property to
establish their technology as proprietary standards.273 Concerted action
under a pool allows patentees to establish a single standard.274 If this pool
is limited in scope, competitors may emerge to challenge the proprietary
standard, as was the case in public key encryption. 275 The difficulty,
however, is that patent pools unite would-be rivals who would otherwise
compete for acceptance by standard setting organizations.276 This concern
is particularly acute where technologies are rapidly evolving and where
patent pools grow with the advance of technology.277 The pools shield
patentees from the pressures that have forced firms like RSA to abandon
their intellectual property, leaving proprietary standards in place.
F. Price Maintenance in the Absence of Express Agreements
The DOJ and the FTC could conceivably adopt rules prohibiting
certain express practices, such as joint royalty setting and package
licensing, in response to the anticompetitive potential of these acts. Such
270 See Flaherty, supra note 268.
271 See Jim Kerstetter, S/MIME Spec Drops RSA Key; Internet Engineering Task Force
Working Group for Secure MIME Decides to Use Less-Expensive Diffie-Hellman Encyrption
Algorithm, PC WK., Dec. 22, 1997, at 6.
272 See Sean Silcoff, Dr. Strangebucks, CANADIAN Bus., Nov. 28, 1997, at 72 (describing
the elliptical curve cryptosystem); Peter Smith, LUC Public-Key Encryption: A Secure Alternative to
RSA, DR. DOBB'S J. OF SOFTWARE ToOLS, Jan. 1993, at 44 (describing LUC cryptosystem).
273 The Public Key Partners patent pool, for example, allowed two rival firms to settle their
legal disputes and to jointly establish their public key cryptography method as an industry standard,
absent endorsement from a standard setting organization. See supra notes 21-30 and accompanying
text.
274 See id.; see also G. Pascal Zachary, Big Business: Let's Play Oligopoly!: Why Giants
Like Having Other Giants Around, WALL ST. J., Mar. 8, 1999, at BI.
275 See supra notes 271-272 and accompanying text.
276 RSA and Cylink dominated the public key encryption industry through their patent pool
up until its breakup in 1994. See Crypto Pool, supra note 24. In 1997, the former partners competed
with one another for IETF approval as a standard, resulting in the adoption of the non-proprietary
Cylink standard. See Kerstetter, supra note 271. Had the patent pool remained intact, the IETF would
likely have been forced into adopting the proprietary RSA protocol.
277 This concern is apparent with the MPEG LA patent pool. The MPEG-2 patent pool
nearly doubled in size from 27 to 46 patents in less than two years. Technological advance has blurred
the distinction between the MPEG-2 protocol and the MPEG-4 protocol, with the boundaries between
these sets of patents unclear. See supra notes 76-103 and accompanying text.
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express agreements are not necessary, however, to perpetuate price
maintenance. Once patents are pooled, several mechanisms permit
patentees to raise the price of patented goods that had sold at lower levels
prior to formation of the pool.
1. Royalty Rebate Schemes
A royalty rebate scheme, for example, provides one mechanism for
patentees to maintain an appearance of free competition while raising
prices. As George Priest observes, patentees can assign their patents to the
pool, which, in turn, licenses the use of the patents back to the members at
a fixed royalty rate.27" The cost to the pool members of using their own
technology thus increases by a certain amount, which is then passed on to
their licensees in the price of patented goods. The pool members each
compete individually in the market, without mutual agreement as to the
prices they exact from licensees. The prices set by the members and their
licensees are thus competitively priced, but, because the input price of the
licensor has been raised by the total prices paid to the pool, the end price to
the licensee is elevated. It remains, then, for the pool members to recapture
the prices paid into the pool. The royalty rebate can be disguised in various
ways, such as through equipment sales.279
2. Hostage Theory
Pools of blocking patents provide a subtle means for enforcing tacit
collusive agreements between rival patentees. The establishment of a pool
and the prospect of its dissolution create a mechanism for imposing
discipline on members who violate collusive agreements. The assets of
each member are held "hostage" by the other members of the pool, subject
to harm if covenants of the pool are breached.28°
Pool members hold each others' licenses hostage. If the pool is
comprised of blocking patents, then a licensee of any member of the pool
can be sued by all the other members. The members may tacitly agree to
maintain prices, to restrict output, or to divide territories. If one member of
the pool licenses a customer at terms that violate the levels established
through the tacit agreements, then the other members may decide to
dissolve the pool and to sue the breaching member's licensees.
Such threats cause substantial damage. In the case of public key
278 See Priest, supra note 70, at 315.
279 See id. at 314-15.
280 See Mukesh Eswaran, Cross-Licensing of Competing Patents as a Facilitating Device, 27
CANADIAN J. ECON. 689, 691 (1993). Hostage theory was first advanced by Oliver Williamson. See
Oliver E. Williamson, Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange, 73 AM. ECON.
REv. 519 (1983).
Vol. 16:359, 1999
Patent Pools and the Antitrust Dilemma
encryption, for example, the dissolution of the pool formed by two
blocking patentees caused major disruption in the market for this important
technology.28' RSA, the improver patentee, had licensed its patents
broadly.282 Many of the pool's licensees held licenses only to RSA's
technology, without right to Cylink's patents.283 When the pool dissolved
in the wake of various disagreements between the partners,8 4 Cylink
waged a campaign against RSA's licensees, threatening them with
infringement of Cylink's patents.285 Cylink demanded from RSA's
customers a one-time payment of between $50,000 and $75,000.286 Cylink
also exacerbated the breakup by disrupting a standardization process in the
financial community that would have led to the adoption of RSA's
technology.287 The effects of the breakup of the patent pool were reported
as such:
Until the fight [between Cylink and RSA] began, the RSA
algorithm was fast becoming the de facto industry standard for
encryption. Companies like Microsoft, Apple, Novell, and Lotus
all employ RSA technology in their products. Now, all bets are off
on the pace of paperless transactions. There is nothing like a
heated patent dispute to chill the waters of commerce in an
emerging industry.
288
The example of public key encryption shows that patentees stand to lose
substantially from the breakup of patent pools. The downside risk imposes
discipline on patentees to respect mutual agreements, whatever their
nature, and to ensure the long-term viability of the pool.
G. Favorable Antitrust Standards in Patent Pools
Patent pools pose further threats to the competitive market by
entitling members to more favorable standards in antitrust litigation. For
an antitrust case to succeed, complainants must first cross the threshold
determination of whether the challenged patents are blocking or
competing. As stated above, federal law permits patentees to escape
281 See Crypto Pool, supra note 24.
282 See Taft, supra note 27 (quoting D. James Bidzos, President of RSA, who stated that as
of 1992, RSA had licensed more than two-thirds of the computer industry, as measured by revenue).
283 See Crypto Pool, supra note 24.
284 See RSA Data Sec., Inc. v. Cylink Corp., No. 96-20094 SW, 1996 WL 107272, at *3
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 1996); With Partners Like This... RSA, PKP Spat: It's Really Getting Fun, INFO.
L. ALERT: A VOORHEES REP., Mar. 10, 1995 [hereinafter RSA, PKP Spat].
285 See At War Over Crypto, INFO. L. ALERT: A VOORHEES REP., Oct. 13, 1995.
286 See id.
287 See RSA, PKP Spat, supra note 284.
288 Crypto Pool, supra note 24.
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liability for challenged licensing practices when it is shown that the pool
comprises blocking, rather than competing, patents.28 9 There is a fine
distinction between these two sets of patents, requiring extensive fact
finding and uncertain litigation.290 Complainants face a protracted trial
when patentees can assert that the motivation to pool the challenged
patents was predicated on the clearing of blocking patents.
Furthermore, where patents are not concerned, courts prohibit inter-
firm agreements containing price fixing agreements and territorial
restrictions.291 Such restrictions are not subject to per se rules, however,
when patents are involved. The patent statute explicitly prevents courts
from establishing a per se rule against territorial restrictions in such
arrangements, providing that a patentee or licensor may "grant and convey
an exclusive right under his [patent] ... to the whole or any specified part
of the United States."'2 92 Abuse of this right may subject a patentee to the
strictures of the antitrust laws, but mere exercise of this right cannot be
forbidden in a per se rule.293 Prosecutions for abuse of price fixing
agreements or territorial restrictions in patent cases must proceed under the
rule of reason, requiring a full trial.294 Given limited enforcement
resources, the DOJ and the FTC will be less likely to commence
proceedings against a suspect patent pool than against firms dealing in
unpatented goods.
Conclusion
The DOJ and the FTC have opened a new era in the regulation of
patent pools. The 1995 IP Licensing Guidelines are a landmark, and the
MPEG LA approval is "definitely a first in recent history, and likely a first
on patent pooling. '295 The Guidelines and the approval of the MPEG pool
289 See Carpet Seaming Tape Licensing Corp. v. Best Seam, Inc., 616 F.2d 1133, 1142-43
(9th Cir. 1980) (reversing finding of patent misuse for failure of trial court to determine if challenged
patents were blocking, rather than competing); International Mfg. Co. v. Landon, Inc., 336 F.2d 723,
729 (9th Cir. 1964) (distinguishing between pools of blocking and competing patents, and denying a
finding of antitrust violations and patent misuse for pooling of blocking patents); IP LICENSING
GUIDELINES, supra note 4, at 107 ex. 10 (distinguishing blocking patents from competing patents and
suggesting that the DOJ will not challenge combinations of blocking patents).
290 See Goller, supra note 31, at 726 ("[O]ne of the purposes of this paper is to show that the
lines of demarcation among the three categories [blocking, competing, and complementary patents] are
very narrow and that in many instances, a mere shift of focus or frame of reference will result in a
different categorization for the same patents.").
291 See, e.g., United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927) (prohibiting price
fixing); United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898) (prohibiting territorial
allocations).
292 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1994).
293 See Priest, supra note 70, at 315.
294 See id.
295 Sabra Chartrand, Patents: The Federal Government Will Allow a Group of Companies to
Unify Administration of 27 Patents, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 1997, at D8 (quoting Bill Brooks, DOJ
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are remarkable for their explicit recognition of the procompetitive benefits
of patent pools. The Guidelines, especially as read through the MPEG LA
business review letter, are especially important for their adoption of the
blocking patents exception to the antitrust laws. This exception, it is
reasoned, is essential to free up technology that would be suppressed
absent relief from the strictures of antitrust law.
There are a number of problems with this approach, however. First, it
is not clear how thoroughly technology is suppressed by overlapping
patent claims. There certainly are high-profile instances where patent
rights do block the development of important technologies. Often,
however, patented goods are sold competitively, notwithstanding the legal
entanglements created by blocking patents. The DOJ and the FTC have
announced a broad shelter for the pooling of patents that, if unconstrained,
may invite a revival of the abusive patent pools that dominated American
industry throughout much of this century.
The enforcement agencies' acceptance of pools of blocking patents is
particularly troublesome given the difficulty of delineating such pools,
especially when the number of relevant patents is large. The notion of a
pool of blocking patents does not have clear limits. The MPEG LA pool
illustrates this difficulty. Whereas the DOJ first understood that twenty-
seven patents were "most" of the protocol's essential patents, that number
has nearly doubled, in less than two years, to forty-six. Once a pool is
created, its outer boundaries are prone to expand. The danger is that the
pool will continue to evolve and incorporate competing technologies and
invalid patents.
Patent pools have been used as a tool throughout the twentieth
century to cartelize industry and to circumvent the antitrust laws.
Technological advance can justify some restraints on trade. But the DOJ
and the FTC must carefully assess whether proposed pools would cover
valid patents that are blocked both in law and in fact. The authorities must
also impose limits upon the future growth of patent pools in order to
prevent the incorporation of evolving technologies and invalid patents into
yesterday's pools. Although patent pools can be an important means of
promoting technology, undue deference to the interests of patentees risks
sacrificing core principles of antitrust law.
spokesman).

